University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law
12-2018

Prophylactic Merger Policy
Herbert J. Hovenkamp
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Economic Policy Commons, Economic Theory
Commons, Industrial Organization Commons, Intellectual Property Law Commons, Internet Law
Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons

Repository Citation
Hovenkamp, Herbert J., "Prophylactic Merger Policy" (2018). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 1955.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1955

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu.

70.1-HOVENKAMP.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

12/22/18 8:40 PM

Prophylactic Merger Policy
HERBERT HOVENKAMP†

† James G. Dinan University Professor, Penn Law and the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.
Thank you to Fiona M. Scott-Morton for commenting on a draft.

[45]

70.1-HOVENKAMP.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

46

12/22/18 8:40 PM

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 70:43

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 46
I. IMPROPER USES OF INCIPIENCY TESTS ..................................................... 49
II. MERGERS THREATENING HORIZONTAL COORDINATED INTERACTION ..... 51
III. HORIZONTAL MERGERS FACILITATING UNILATERAL ANTICOMPETITIVE
EFFECTS ................................................................................................ 55
IV. INCIPIENCY AND VERTICAL ACQUISITIONS ............................................... 57
V. ANTICOMPETITIVE ACQUISITIONS OF PATENTS OR OTHER IP RIGHTS ...... 66
VI. ACQUISITIONS OF SMALL BUT HIGHLY INNOVATIVE FIRMS ...................... 70
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 73
INTRODUCTION
An important purpose of the antitrust merger law is to arrest certain
practices in their “incipiency,” by preventing business firm acquisitions that are
likely to facilitate them. Many decisions involving both mergers and other
practices had recognized this idea as an important purpose of the Clayton Act as
early as the 1920s.1 The Supreme Court doubled down on the incipiency idea in
its Brown Shoe Co. v. United States merger decision, where it expressed concern
about a “rising tide of economic concentration” and attributed to Congress a
desire to halt this trend “at its outset and before it gathered momentum.”2
Speaking of the legislative history of the 1950 Celler-Kefauver amendments to
the merger statute,3 the Court attributed to Congress a “provision of authority
for arresting mergers at a time when the trend to a lessening of competition in a
line of commerce was still in its incipiency” before they would “justify a
Sherman Act proceeding.”4 The importance of Brown Shoe was not its
1. See, e.g., United States v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 588, 592–93 (1957) (“[I]t is
the purpose of the Clayton Act to nip monopoly in the bud” (quoting Transamerica Corp. v. Bd. of Governors
of Fed. Reserve Sys., 206 F.2d 163, 169 (3d Cir. 1953)). Even earlier the Supreme Court made similar
observations about the Federal Trade Commission Act. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Motion Picture Advert. Serv.
Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394–95 (1953) (“It is also clear that the Federal Trade Commission Act was designed to
supplement and bolster the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act—to stop in their incipiency acts and practices
which, when full blown, would violate those Acts, as well as to condemn as ‘unfair methods of competition’
existing violations of them” (citations omitted)); Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n,
312 U.S. 457, 466 (1941) (ascribing incipiency purpose to FTC Act in boycott case); Fed. Trade Comm’n v.
Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 647–48 (1931) (consumer protection decision attributing incipiency test to Clayton
Act); see also Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738, 741 (2d Cir. 1953) (noting incipiency
rationale in merger case); cf. Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 324 U.S. 726, 738 (1945) (ascribing
incipiency rationale to price discrimination provision of section 2 of the Clayton Act, as amended in 1936 by the
Robinson-Patman Act); Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 356 (1922) (applying
Clayton Act incipiency to exclusive dealing under section 3 of the Clayton Act: “[t]he Clayton Act sought to
reach the agreements embraced within its sphere in their incipiency . . . .”).
2. 370 U.S. 294, 315, 318 (1962).
3. Celler-Kefauver Act, Pub. L. No. 81-899, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18
(2012)).
4. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 317, 318 n.32 (quoting S. REP. NO. 81-1775, at 4–5 (1950)); accord S. REP.
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recognition of an incipiency rationale as such, which was already well
established, but rather its reading of the legislative history of the 1950s
amendments as giving Congress’ imprimatur on a particular theory linking
merger policy to market concentration.
Today Brown Shoe’s particular application of an incipiency test seems
excessive and ill-conceived. The merger in question increased the defendant’s
market share from 5.6% to 7.2%,5 in an unconcentrated market and would not
receive so much as a second glance from the antitrust enforcement agencies
today. As one commentator later observed, this incipiency test permitted the
government “to halt mergers well before any adverse economic effects could be
discerned through econometrics or other empirical techniques.”6
Most importantly, the Court did not explain why an incipiency test would
be necessary to address the particular problem it identified. In the future, merger
law could always be brought to bear if the relevant numbers became larger, and
market share numbers are readily available. That is, once structural thresholds
for identifying problematic mergers are identified there is no need to condemn
mergers that fall below that threshold. There is no principle of either law or fact
that precludes the courts from enjoining a merger once the threshold has been
exceeded.7
This does not mean that incipiency tests are unimportant. They have a
proper place, but it is not the one that the Supreme Court identified in Brown
Shoe.8 The appropriate use of incipiency tests is to prevent certain bad outcomes
early when antitrust rules make it difficult or impossible to prevent them later.
The language of the merger statute, section 7 of the Clayton Act, is very
broad. It prevents mergers whose effect “may be substantially to lessen
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”9 The thing that triggers it is an
acquisition of either equity shares or productive assets.10 Section 7 has no
agreement requirement, such as that which limits enforcement of section 1 of
the Sherman Act.11 Nor is it limited by the severe constraints that the law has
NO. 81-1775, at 4–5 (1950) (“The intent here . . . is to cope with monopolistic tendencies in their incipiency and
well before they have attained such effects as would justify a Sherman Act proceeding.”).
5. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 345; see also Thomas W. Hazlett, Is Antitrust Anticompetitive?, 9 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 277, 320 tbl.11(1986) (market shares measured by number of stores).
6. Stephen M. Axinn, In Search of Congruence Between Legislative Purpose and Administrative Policy,
2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 431, 436. An analogous criticism can be applied to some of the pre-Brown Shoe
decisions involving practices other than mergers. See, for example, Justice Frankfurter’s dissent in Motion
Picture Advert., 344 U.S. at 398–99, complaining that the exclusive contracts in question ran for one year and
covered only about six percent of the country’s theaters; as a result, they caused no competitive harm.
7. See generally Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Incipiency, Mergers and the Size Question: Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, 1 ANTITRUST BULL. 533 (writing in response to the Celler-Kefauver Act, but prior to the Court’s
decision in Brown Shoe, and objecting that the incipiency test threatened to be overdeterrent).
8. On the proper way to evaluate market structure in merger cases, see Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl
Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers, Market Structure, and Burdens of Proof, 127 YALE L.J. 1996, 1997 (2018).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012).
10. 5 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1201a (4th ed. 2016).
11. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1 (reaching contracts, combinations, and conspiracies), with Clayton Act, ch. 323,
§ 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731–32 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18) (pertaining only to corporations that
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quite properly placed on the use of antitrust law to limit single firm conduct,12
which includes conduct that seeks to enforce the patent laws.13 Beyond that,
section 7 of the Clayton Act shares the general antitrust goal of identifying and
preventing business mergers that enable the post-merger firm to reduce marketwide output and impose higher prices on consumers. Its effects test is indifferent
to the mechanisms by which a merger lessens competition, provided that the
anticompetitive effect can be attributed to the merger.14
Incipiency tests for mergers are most valuable in cases where a merger is
likely to lead to conduct or behavior that is both anticompetitive and also is
difficult or impossible for antitrust law to reach once the merger has occurred.
This can happen in a variety of situations, some of which have been recognized
while others have not.
Antitrust merger law does not have a “regulatory” mandate, and this makes
incipiency tests particularly important. Nothing in the statute or its legislative
history suggests that Congress believed the federal courts should use ongoing
supervision of post-merger firms in order to limit anticompetitive conduct that
might occur later on. Some merger consent decrees have lost sight of this by
seeking to control conduct that might occur long after the merger was
consummated.15 Consent decrees are contracts and can specify whatever the
parties want, provided the parties’ agreements are not independently unlawful.
Nevertheless, such decrees can blur the important line between antitrust and
regulation, sometimes thrusting general jurisdiction Article III courts into roles
for which they are not well-suited. The language of section 7 authorizes courts
to condemn mergers whose effect may be substantially to limit competition. It
does not authorize them to supervise the behavior of post-merger firms as if they
were public utilities.
Today, most mergers are challenged before they occur.16 As a result, the
feared post-merger conduct has not occurred either and courts are limited to
evidence of predicted rather than actual effects. This fact makes it important to
place some limits on merger law’s prophylactic reach. First, the language of
section 7 requires causation. It prohibits mergers where the effect may be
substantially to lessen competition. This requires a showing that the merger is
what is likely to facilitate the feared anticompetitive conduct. Second, we need
to be satisfied that this conduct, if it should occur, will be both anticompetitive
and difficult to reach through direct application of the antitrust laws. Third, the
“acquire” some or all of the stock or assets of other corporations); see also 6 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1400 (4th ed. 2017); 7 id. ¶¶ 1437–60.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 2; see also 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 771, at 202–
06 (4th ed. 2015); 3A id. ¶ 726, at 57–83; 3B id. ¶ 773, at 256–84.
13. See 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 12, ¶¶ 704–13.
14. Specifically, “where . . . the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to
tend to create a monopoly.” 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012).
15. E.g., United States v. Comcast Corp., 808 F. Supp. 2d 145, 149–50 (D.D.C. 2011) (ordering consent
decree lasting two years).
16. See 4 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 12 ¶ 941i (“Most government challenges to
mergers occur prior to their consummation, when there is no actual record of post-acquisition entry.”).
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merger must raise a significant risk that the conduct will occur. This calls for an
objective test, assuming profit maximizing and then considering the alternatives
that are realistically available to the post-merger firm. Finally, as with all merger
cases, there must not be offsetting gains that serve to justify the merger
notwithstanding these threats to competition.17
The range of behaviors for which merger law’s prophylactic reach can be
relevant includes the following:
(1) A horizontal merger might facilitate coordinated interaction, which
would be either difficult to detect as collusion, or difficult to challenge
given the “agreement” requirement contained in section 1 of the
Sherman Act.18
(2) A horizontal merger might create either a monopoly or else enable a
post-merger firm to increase its price, or engage unilaterally in some
other output-limiting practice that is unreachable under section 2 of the
Sherman Act, given antitrust’s broad tolerance for unilateral conduct.19
(3) A vertical merger might facilitate a post-merger unilateral price
increase, price discrimination, refusal to deal, or other exclusion that,
once again, would be very difficult to reach when the conduct in
question is that of a single firm.20
(4) An intellectual property (IP) acquisition, particularly of a patent
developed by an outside inventor, might result in exclusionary
enforcement that would be impossible for antitrust to reach unless the
patent is invalid or unenforceable.21
(5) Acquisitions of small but highly innovative startups might enable a
large firm to continue its domination of a market in the face of entry
threats, but in ways that are not reachable as unilateral conduct.22
This Article discusses the legitimate and illegitimate rationales for
incipiency tests, as well as important limitations. First it looks at some improper
uses of such tests. Then it discusses appropriate uses, beginning with those that
are relatively well recognized in the case law and literature and moving on to
those that are largely unrecognized.
I. IMPROPER USES OF INCIPIENCY TESTS
Merger incipiency tests are unjustified in two situations. One is when we
are unable to predict with sufficient confidence that a certain anticompetitive
outcome will occur and that it can be attributed to the merger. The other is when
17. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Appraising Merger Efficiencies, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 703, 716 (2017).
18. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 32–39.
19. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 40–52.
20. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 53–86.
21. See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 175–78 (1965)
(enforcement of a patent procured by fraud on the Patent Office may violate section 2 of the Sherman Act, as
long as all the other elements to establish monopolization are proved); discussion infra text accompanying notes
87–109.
22. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 111–119.
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the feared post-merger anticompetitive conduct is readily remedied by the
antitrust laws if it should occur. In both these cases, concerns about possible
anticompetitive outcomes down the road must give way to the promise of merger
efficiencies.
Most mergers are lawful because they are thought to generate cost savings
from economies of scale, integration, elimination of market transactions, or
some other efficiency.23 To be sure, once a prima facie case against a merger is
established, efficiency defenses are very difficult to prove. But the assumption
that many mergers produce efficiencies is built into our prima facie case to begin
with.24 As a result, we do not want to condemn a merger based on mere
speculation that it might lead to some anticompetitive outcome. Nor do we want
to condemn a merger when some practice, which may or may not occur later, is
readily remedied at that time.
Post-merger predatory pricing is a good example of a practice that does not
become likely merely because a merger may make it structurally conceivable.
Only a dominant firm can succeed in monopolistic predatory pricing as
condemned by the Sherman Act.25 But that hardly means that every firm with a
minimum sufficient market share is likely to engage in predatory pricing.
Predatory pricing is a risky strategy even for a dominant firm and very likely is
relatively uncommon.26 As a result, a merger should not be condemned merely
because it creates a firm with a sufficiently large market share to make predatory
pricing factually plausible.27 The same thing is true about a firm’s acquisition of
a patent portfolio that is likely to contain some weak patents. Ownership of an
invalid or unenforceable patent is a prerequisite to Walker Process liability for
filing an infringement action based on a worthless patent.28 Nonetheless, the
23. See 4A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, ¶ 970 (discussing the efficiency defense); Hovenkamp,
supra note 17, at 706.
24. Hovenkamp, supra note 17, at 708–11.
25. Am. Acad. Suppliers, Inc. v. Beckley-Cardy, Inc., 922 F.2d 1317, 1320 (7th Cir. 1991) (suggesting that
only monopolists can engage in predatory pricing); 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 12, ¶¶ 725–27
(describing the structural requirements of predation). Non-monopolistic predatory pricing intended to shore up
a faltering oligopoly could be condemned under the Robinson-Patman Act were it not for the severe constraints
imposed by Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 226 (1993); see also 3
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 12, ¶ 726.
26. For an attempt to test for the frequency of predatory pricing, see Kenneth G. Elzinga & David E.
Mills, Testing for Predation: Is Recoupment Feasible?, 34 ANTITRUST BULL. 869, 889–93 (1989), wherein the
authors found predatory pricing to be relatively rare.
27. Cf. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 118–19 (1986) (refusing to condemn a merger
based on the mere possibility of predatory pricing).
28. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 175 (1965) (finding a basis
for antitrust liability in a patentee’s suit over a patent known to be invalid). Antitrust liability can also attach
when the patent is valid, but the infringement plaintiff knows that the defendant is not infringing. See, e.g.,
Moore U.S.A., Inc. v. Standard Register Co., 139 F. Supp. 2d 348, 362 (W.D.N.Y. 2001) (refusing to dismiss a
Sherman section 2 counterclaim allegation that patentee filed an infringement claim while knowing that the
counterclaimant’s product did not infringe); Ecrix Corp. v. Exabyte Corp., 95 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1158–59 (D.
Colo. 2000) (holding that, for purposes of filing an antitrust claim, the infringement defendant was entitled to
discovery of the factual basis for the infringement allegations); United States v. Besser Mfg. Co., 96 F. Supp.
304, 312 (E.D. Mich. 1951) (finding the infringement plaintiff did not have good reason to believe that the
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mere acquisition of a portfolio that contains such patents hardly suggests that the
acquiring firm intends to do just that.
The other set of circumstances when prophylactic rules are unnecessary
and counterproductive is when the feared post-merger practice is readily
remedied with a more direct antitrust rule if it should occur. A good example
here is the use of section 7 to condemn mergers on the theory that they might
condemn anticompetitive tying or reciprocity.29 Most of the case law suggests
that unlawful tying requires a minimum market share in the range of thirty to
forty percent.30 So a horizontal merger might create the requisite minimum
market share to make unlawful tying possible.31 Alternatively, a nonhorizontal
merger, such as a union of complements, might create an opportunity for tying
two products together.32 Anticompetitive tying and reciprocity are readily
detected, however. They cannot be done secretly because the person upon whom
these restraints are imposed, and a likely plaintiff, must be aware of it. Further,
very few people would argue that the existing rules for addressing these practices
are underdeterrent. In addition, many instances of tying and reciprocity are
competitively benign. As a result, condemning a merger on the theory that it
might later lead to tying or reciprocity is doubly overdeterrent. First, it condemns
a merger without knowing whether this particular conduct will occur and,
secondly, without knowing whether it will be anticompetitive if it does occur.
II. MERGERS THREATENING HORIZONTAL COORDINATED INTERACTION
Merger incipiency analysis is most fully developed for the traditional
horizontal merger that makes an industry more concentrated, thus increasing the
likelihood of collusion or collusion-like behavior. If a merger of two competitors
reduces the number of firms in a market from, say, four to three, the three-firm
post-merger market might be more susceptible to traditional price fixing, or the
firms might be in a better position to engage in coordinated interaction that
permits them to raise their prices. Because collusion is done in secret, it is not

infringement defendant’s technology infringed), aff’d, 343 U.S. 444 (1952).
29. Reciprocity resembles tying except that the two products move through the market in opposite
directions. For example, a firm that both processes chickens and produces chicken feed might purchase chickens
from growers only on the condition participating growers use its feed. See FTC v. Consol. Foods Corp., 380
U.S. 592, 594–95 (1965) (condemning a merger on the theory that it would facilitate compelled reciprocity);
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 13.3a, at
751 (5th ed. 2016).
30. E.g., Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 7 (1984) (holding thirty percent insufficient);
see also 5 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, ¶¶ 1735–36.
31. A merger that created a firm with a thirty percent market share could result in a post-merger
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) under 1500, provided other firms in the market were small. That would
make the post-merger market “unconcentrated” under the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines and the merger
would be approved with “no further analysis,” even though the thirty percent share could make anticompetitive
tying possible. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
§ 5.3, at 19 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES].
32. E.g., Betaseed, Inc. v. U & I, Inc., 681 F.2d 1203, 1221 (9th Cir. 1982); Spartan Grain & Mill Co. v.
Ayers, 581 F.2d 419, 424 (5th Cir. 1978); see also 5 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 12, ¶ 1143.
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always detected and can be difficult to prove. Further, collusion-like behavior
can be condemned only if the conduct satisfies the “agreement” requirement of
section 1 of the Sherman Act. Many instances of acknowledged conscious
parallelism do not.33
In this case, the Horizontal Merger Guidelines recognize the danger. They
state their purpose as interdicting mergers that might “create, enhance, or
entrench market power or [] facilitate its exercise.”34 They also articulate the
incipiency concern that some mergers might facilitate collusion-like practices
that are “not otherwise condemned by the antitrust laws.”35
Horizontal merger law would be more difficult to justify if every
anticompetitive instance of collusion-like behavior could be promptly detected
and remedied when it occurred. In that case the better approach would often be
to wait and see. We could permit the merger to go forward, which would allow
whatever efficiencies the merger creates, confident that if collusive behavior
should ever occur the courts would be able to detect and prevent it. Robert Bork,
who believed that oligopoly existed only in economics textbooks, held this view
and thus absolutely rejected an incipiency test for horizontal mergers.36
By contrast, Judge Richard Posner believed that an incipiency test was
essential to antitrust policy against horizontal mergers. In Hospital Corp. of
America v. FTC, he observed that a concentration-increasing merger among
hospitals in Chattanooga Tennessee increased the likelihood of coordination
leading to lower output and higher prices.37 If such collusion should occur it
33. E.g., Valspar Corp. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 873 F.3d 185, 191 (3d Cir. 2017) (finding that
section 1 of the Sherman Act did not reach acknowledged oligopoly pricing, including inter-firm
communication, in a concentrated market for a fungible chemical); In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 782
F.3d 867, 871–79 (7th Cir. 2015) (ruling conscious parallelism insufficient to establish conspiracy under section
1 of the Sherman Act); Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris U.S.A., 346 F.3d 1287, 1299 (11th Cir. 2003) (ruling
the same); Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 484 (1st Cir. 1988) (ruling the same).
34. 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 31, § 1, at 2.
35. Id. § 7, at 25. Specifically, the guidelines state:
Coordinated interaction includes a range of conduct. Coordinated interaction can involve the explicit
negotiation of a common understanding of how firms will compete or refrain from competing. Such
conduct typically would itself violate the antitrust laws. Coordinated interaction also can involve a
similar common understanding that is not explicitly negotiated but would be enforced by the
detection and punishment of deviations that would undermine the coordinated interaction.
Coordinated interaction alternatively can involve parallel accommodating conduct not pursuant to a
prior understanding. Parallel accommodating conduct includes situations in which each rival’s
response to competitive moves made by others is individually rational, and not motivated by
retaliation or deterrence nor intended to sustain an agreed-upon market outcome, but nevertheless
emboldens price increases and weakens competitive incentives to reduce prices or offer customers
better terms. Coordinated interaction includes conduct not otherwise condemned by the antitrust
laws.
Id. § 7, at 24–25.
36. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 131 (1978) (arguing
that an incipiency test for mergers has “no value whatever”); see also id. at 221 (doubting that oligopoly behavior
existed “outside of economics textbooks”).
37. 807 F.2d 1381, 1387, 1389 (7th Cir. 1986) (“The reduction in the number of competitors is significant
in assessing the competitive vitality of the Chattanooga hospital market. The fewer competitors there are in a
market, the easier it is for them to coordinate their pricing without committing detectable violations of section 1
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might be both difficult to condemn and difficult to prosecute, given antitrust
law’s “agreement” requirement. Further, he reasoned:
Section 7 does not require proof that a merger or other acquisition has caused
higher prices in the affected market. All that is necessary is that the merger create
an appreciable danger of [collusive practices] in the future. A predictive
judgment, necessarily probabilistic and judgmental rather than demonstrable, is
called for.38

That “appreciable danger” formulation seems to state the threat about right.
“Certainty” is too strict; “possibility” is not strict enough.39 Collusion or
collusion-like behavior is much more likely to result from a concentrationincreasing merger than is a practice such as predatory pricing.40 Mergers
significantly increasing the likelihood of such behavior represent a realistic
threat of post-merger anticompetitive conduct that the antitrust laws will not be
able to discipline effectively in many instances.
An incipiency test for coordination-facilitating mergers should thus
attempt to identify situations where market structure or other features make
anticompetitive coordination profitable, difficult to detect, difficult to prove
under Sherman section 1 legal standards, or difficult to remedy at an early stage.
Taking these factors seriously will likely result in increased scrutiny of
coordination-facilitating mergers, particularly when the number of substantial
firms in the market prior to the merger exceeds three, where entry barriers as
historically measured are not all that high, or where efficiencies might otherwise
be thought to tip the scale in favor of the merger.
Numerous Sherman Act section 1 decisions involving tight oligopoly
industries have rejected price fixing allegations by concluding that conspiracies
are more difficult to prove in such markets than in those that are more
competitively structured. This outcome, which is completely perverse from an
enforcement perspective, is that the very factors that make unspoken coordinated
interaction more likely also undermine many types of evidence of a qualifying

of the Sherman Act, which forbids price fixing.”).
38. Id. at 1389 (citation omitted).
39. As one recent district court decision put it:
By using “the words ‘may be substantially to lessen competition’” in Section 7, Congress indicated
“that its concern was with probabilities, not certainties.” Although certainty of harm is not necessary
to prove a Section 7 violation, neither is the “mere possibility” of harm sufficient. Rather, to grant
injunctive relief under the Clayton Act, the Court must conclude that the Government has introduced
evidence sufficient to show that the challenged “transaction is likely to lessen competition
substantially.” As part of satisfying that burden, Section 7 “demand[s] that a plaintiff demonstrate
that the substantial lessening of competition will be ‘sufficiently probable and imminent’ to warrant
relief.”
United States v. AT&T, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 189–90 (D.D.C. 2018) (first quoting FTC v. Whole
Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1042 (D.C. Cir. 2008); then quoting FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d
708, 713 (D.C. Cir. 2001); then quoting United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 985 (D.C. Cir.
1990); and then quoting FTC v. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 109, 115 (D.D.C. 2004)), appeal docketed,
No. 18-5214 (D.C. Cir. July 13, 2018).
40. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 25–26.
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“contract,” “combination,” or “conspiracy,” as the Sherman Act requires.41 The
2017 Third Circuit Valspar Corp. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. decision
was particularly candid:
In non-oligopolistic markets, “[p]arallel behavior among competitors is
especially probative of price fixing because it is the sine qua non of a price fixing
conspiracy.” But in an oligopolistic market, parallel behavior “can be a necessary
fact of life,” and “[a]ccordingly, evidence of conscious parallelism cannot alone
create a reasonable inference of a conspiracy.” Therefore, to prove an
oligopolistic conspiracy with proof of parallel behavior, that evidence “must go
beyond mere interdependence” and “be so unusual that in the absence of an
advance agreement, no reasonable firm would have engaged in it.”42

In sum, it becomes much easier to prove a “conspiracy,” and thus obtain
Sherman Act liability, in a less concentrated market, or one that is not conducive
to coordinated interaction for other reasons, than in a market that is highly prone
to noncompetitive performance.
In Valspar the relevant product was titanium dioxide, a chemical sold in an
acknowledged oligopoly. Five firms sold most of the product, although there
were others.43 In the Chocolate Confectionary case, the Third Circuit reached
essentially the same conclusion in a market dominated by three companies that
controlled seventy-five percent of the market.44 The same thing was true of In
41. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
42. 873 F.3d 185, 193 (3d Cir. 2017) (first quoting Southway Theatres, Inc. v. Ga. Theatre Co., 672 F.2d
485, 501 (5th Cir. 1982); then quoting In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 122 (3d Cir. 1999); then
quoting In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 801 F.3d 383, 398 (3d Cir. 2015); and then quoting Baby
Food, 166 F.3d at 135); see also In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 358 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[T]his Court
and others have been cautious in accepting inferences from circumstantial evidence in cases involving
allegations of horizontal price-fixing among oligopolists.”). In Flat Glass, the court went on to state:
The theory of interdependence posits the following: In a market with many firms, the effects of
any single firm’s price and output decisions “would be so diffused among its numerous competitors
that they would not be aware of any change.” In a highly concentrated market (i.e., a market
dominated by few firms), however, any single firm’s “price and output decisions will have a
noticeable impact on the market and on its rivals.” Thus when a firm in a concentrated market (i.e.,
an “oligopolist”) is deciding on a course of action, “any rational decision must take into account the
anticipated reaction of the other [ ] firms.”
The result, according to the theory of interdependence, is that firms in a concentrated market may
maintain their prices at supracompetitive levels, or even raise them to those levels, without engaging
in any overt concerted action.
Id. at 359 (alteration in original) (first quoting 6 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
¶ 1429, at 206 (2d ed. 2000); then quoting id.; and then quoting id. at 207). For a broad discussion about parallel
oligopostic behavior, see generally William H. Page, Tacit Agreement Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 81
ANTITRUST L.J. 593 (2017). For attempts to get around the problem by substituting a more economic
understanding of agreement, or eliminating the common law agreement requirement, see generally Robert H.
Porter, Detecting Collusion, 26 REV. INDUS. ORG. 147, 147–48 (2005). See generally Louis Kaplow, Direct
Versus Communications-Based Prohibitions on Price Fixing, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 449 (2011); Louis Kaplow,
On the Meaning of Horizontal Agreements in Competition Law, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 683 (2011); Louis Kaplow,
An Economic Approach to Price Fixing, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 343 (2011); Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the
Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562 (1969).
43. See Valspar Corp. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours, 152 F. Supp. 3d 234, 238–39 (D. Del. 2016)
(identifying DuPont, Huntsman, Kronos, Millennium, and Tronox as the largest firms).
44. In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litigation, 801 F.3d 383, 391 (3d Cir. 2015).
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re Baby Food Antitrust Litigation, where four firms controlled about ninetyeight percent of the market.45 Several other cases involved markets with similar
structures.46
So, one important trigger for horizontal merger enforcement should be a
market, as the Valspar case suggests, where existing Sherman section 1 case law
would be unlikely to infer a section 1 violation from parallel conduct in the postmerger market. This makes more aggressive merger enforcement necessary to
limit the number of such situations.
Further, merger law permits mergers to be challenged prior to their
occurrence and thus before the harm from coordinated interaction has
materialized. Once again, this is particularly valuable in situations where
coordinated interaction is difficult to detect and remedy directly under section 1
of the Sherman Act.
III. HORIZONTAL MERGERS FACILITATING UNILATERAL ANTICOMPETITIVE
EFFECTS
A small but important subset of mergers create a monopoly or dominant
firm in the affected market.47 Once such a firm has been created, its unilateral
dealing and pricing decisions are virtually out of reach of the antitrust laws.48
A much larger subset of mergers falls into the general category of
anticompetitive “unilateral effects” actions. Today, the agencies analyze more
mergers under unilateral effects theories than they do under traditional
coordinated effects theories. According to one paper by insiders, unilateral
effects investigations at the FTC account for about three-fourths of the total.49
The most frequently used of these theories applies when the merging firms offer
relatively close substitutes in a product differentiated market. The merger
facilitates a price increase by eliminating competition between them, forcing
consumers either to pay more or else select a more remote substitute.50 The price
effects are said to be unilateral because only the post-merger firm charges the
higher price; other firms in the market are generally unaffected. The theory does
45. 166 F.3d 112, 116 (3d Cir. 1999).
46. In re Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 364 (finding market dominance with five firms); Williamson Oil Co., Inc.
v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1291 (11th Cir. 2003) (concluding there was product market dominance
where the nation’s four largest cigarette manufacturers produced more than ninety seven percent of cigarettes
sold in the United States); Reserve Supply Corp. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 971 F.2d 37, 49, 55 (7th
Cir. 1992) (finding dominance when three firms held eighty five to ninety percent of the market); Kleen Prods.,
LLC v. Int’l Paper, 276 F. Supp. 3d 811, 819 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (finding dominance with approximately five rivals).
47. E.g., FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 568 U.S. 216, 222 (2013) (merger gave one firm virtual
monopoly in affected market); N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 322 (1904) (union of parallel railroad
lines created monopoly).
48. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 84–86.
49. Malcolm B. Coate & Shawn W. Ulrick, How Much Does the Choice Between the Theories of Collusion
and Unilateral Effects Matter in Merger Analysis? 22 (May 30, 2018) (unpublished manuscript)
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2995679.
50. For further discussion on this theory, see 4 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 12, ¶¶ 914–15, at 111–
150.
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not require conjectures about what type of interdependent pricing the postmerger firm might engage in with other firms in the market. It does require that
they be maximizers across the range of products that they sell.
The theory for predicting a unilateral price increase from a merger is at
least as robust as the theory for predicting price increases likely to result from
coordinated interaction. While the link between market concentration and the
dangers of coordinated interaction are well-established, the precise mechanism
that the firms will employ is typically unknown at the time the merger occurs.
For example, a merger that reduces the number of firms in a market from four
to three creates an “appreciable danger” of collusion-like behavior,51 but until it
occurs we would not know how this coordination might occur, or whether that
behavior would satisfy section 1’s agreement requirement.
Significantly, however, merger policy does not require the court to know
the precise strategy causing competitive harm. This is because the Clayton Act
states an “effects” test—where “the effect of [the] acquisition may be
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”52 For
unilateral effects cases the inference is more direct than in the case of
coordinated effects. One hypothesizes a price increase of a given magnitude and
then uses information about margins and cross elasticity of demand between the
two merging firms as well as closer, non-merging substitutes. From this, one can
estimate the post-merger firm’s profit-maximizing output and price.53
One of the most important justifications for prophylactic merger policy
occurs when the feared anticompetitive conduct is that of a single firm. This is
true both in cases involving merger to monopoly and those causing
anticompetitive unilateral effects. Under U.S. antitrust law, a firm acting
unilaterally has very little obligation to deal with either rivals or customers.54
Further, unilaterally set prices are beyond antitrust’s reach, provided they are not
predatory,55 and price discrimination is virtually never an antitrust violation.56
While the Robinson-Patman Act may reach the simple practice of charging two
dealers different prices, the statute is not designed to pursue most kinds of price
discrimination, and does not reach price discrimination in the provision of

51. See Hosp. Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1389 (7th Cir. 1986) (“All that is necessary is that the
merger create an appreciable danger of such consequences in the future.”).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012). For a discussion on the merger law’s statement of a test that requires only a
showing of harmful effects, see generally Fiona Scott Morton & Herbert Hovenkamp, Horizontal Shareholding
and Antitrust Policy, 127 YALE L.J. 2026 (2018).
53. See Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: From Hedgehog to Fox in Forty Years, 77
ANTITRUST L.J. 49 (2010); Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An
Economic Alternative to Market Definition, 10 B.E. J. THEORETICAL ECON. 1, 14–15 (2010).
54. See, e.g., Verizon Commc’ns. Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 411 (2004)
(holding monopolist has no antitrust duty to interconnect with rival); United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S.
300, 307–08 (1919) (holding firm has right to refuse to deal); see also 3B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note
12, ¶¶ 770–74, at 195–299.
55. 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 12, ¶ 720.
56. Id. ¶ 721. For a broad discussion on the Robinson-Patman Act, se 14 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 2300–72, at 3–152 (3d ed. 2012).
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services such as video content.57 In any event, the focus of unilateral effects
merger policy is on mergers that threaten simple price increases, and these are
unreachable under antitrust law when they are being imposed by a single firm.
Two rationales are offered to justify the lenient rules that antitrust applies
to single firm conduct under the Sherman Act. First, in most cases, a firm’s
unilateral pricing practices are not anticompetitive. That is, they do not create or
enhance a firm’s market power but rather reflect power that already exists. For
that reason, the United States has never had a rule of no fault monopolization.58
If a firm has market power, the antitrust laws permit it to set its profitmaximizing price or any other nonpredatory price it pleases, provided that it is
acting unilaterally.
The second rationale for antitrust tolerance of a firm’s unilateral pricing
decisions as well as refusals to deal is at least as compelling. Administratively,
it is very difficult to develop remedies against unilateral conduct that do not
involve ongoing regulation of the firm in question. For example, a dealing order
would require a judge to determine with some precision not only the price, but
also precisely which assets must be shared and with whom. If costs or
technology change in subsequent years, then the order would have to be
adjusted. Such a dealing order requires ongoing supervision that virtually turns
the firm into a public utility, except that it is regulated by a court of general
jurisdiction rather than an agency.59
Under the same prophylactic rationale that justifies the antitrust concern
with mergers that facilitate coordinated interaction, merger policy can likewise
assist in avoiding ongoing regulation of the firm in question. While antitrust is
powerless to regulate a single firm’s prices, it can interdict a merger that is likely
to put the firm into a position where it is able profitably to increase its prices
above the competitive level.60
IV. INCIPIENCY AND VERTICAL ACQUISITIONS
A vertical merger involves a buyer and a seller rather than two competitors.
At least since the 1970s, the antitrust enforcement agencies have not challenged
nearly as many vertical mergers as horizontal ones, and over the last three
decades have been much less enthusiastic about doing so.61 This is reflected in
57. See 14 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 56, ¶ 2314, at 39–43. Coverage of the Robinson-Patman
Act is limited to “commodities.” Id. ¶ 2314a, at 33.
58. See 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 12, ¶¶ 630–38, at 68–90 (“[W]hen Areeda and Turner spoke
of a true "no fault" monopolist, they could not mean a monopolist created by a relatively recent merger, for the
merger would then have been a qualifying unlawful practice.”).
59. See 3B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 12, ¶ 653b2.
60. See, e.g., FTC v. Sysco Corp., 113 F. Supp. 3d 1, 62–64 (D.D.C. 2015) (finding merger would eliminate
bidding competition between closest competitors, thus permitting post-merger firm unilaterally to increase its
price); United States v. H & R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 81–82 (D.D.C. 2011) (reasoning similarly,
although ultimately concluding that analysis of unilateral effects was unnecessary).
61. Prior to the district court’s decision in United States v. AT&T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161 (D.D.C. 2018),
appeal docketed, No. 18-5214 (D.C. Cir. July 13, 2018), the last fully litigated case on the merits was Fruehauf
Corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1979), which the Federal Trade Commission lost on appeal.
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the fact that the most recent revision of the vertical merger guidelines was in
1984,62 while the horizontal merger guidelines have been revised regularly
through 2010.63 That failure very likely contributed to the government’s district
court loss in the 2018 AT&T/Time-Warner litigation.64 The bargaining theory
that the government relied on in that case was nowhere developed in government
merger guidelines specifically applied to vertical mergers.65
The 1984 Guidelines were drafted at a time when antitrust policy was
dominated by a Chicago School analysis that saw vertical mergers as rarely
creating competitive problems.66 The purely vertical transaction itself does not
make either the buyer’s or the seller’s market more concentrated, and does not
increase the market share of either of the merging firms. In the longer run, a
transaction that reduces the firm’s costs may increase market share at either or
both levels, but that shift in market share would usually be accompanied by an
output increase and lower prices, rather than vice-versa. In any event, it is not
the purpose of the antitrust laws to condemn cost savings.
Today, most vertical mergers are analyzed under an approach that looks for
instances of anticompetitive foreclosure or discrimination against the customers
of rivals, or, in some cases, constraints on the development of innovative
technologies. In general, foreclosure refers to mechanisms by which a vertically
related firm can raise the costs of rivals in the downstream market by reducing
the availability of inputs or raising their price. Econometric techniques have
been developed for analyzing these price effects, using bargaining theory that is
well developed and conventional in economic analysis.67 As in the case of
horizontal mergers, these methodologies try to identify the pricing and other
dealing strategies that will maximize the post-merger firm’s profits. The models
are thus similar to those applied in unilateral effects merger cases.68 Basically,
they query how the firm’s incentives change as a result of the merger.
Cost savings tend to lower the post-merger firm’s profit-maximizing
prices, while foreclosure of rivals tends to increase them. The ultimate question
is whether the vertical acquisition is likely to lead to higher consumer prices.
This methodology is objective in the sense that it is based on predictions about

62. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES (1984) [hereinafter 1984
GUIDELINES]. Vertical acquisitions are addressed in these Guidelines as “non-horizontal mergers.” Id. §§ 4.0–
4.2.
63. See generally 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 31.
64. AT&T, 310 F. Supp. 3d at 165.
65. See id. at 207. The decision is currently on appeal to the D.C. Circuit. United States v. AT&T Inc., 310
F. Supp. 3d 161 (D.D.C. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-5214 (D.C. Cir. July 13, 2018).
66. Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 936–38 (1979).
67. See Serge Moresi & Steven C. Salop, vGUPPI: Scoring Unilateral Pricing Incentives in Vertical
Mergers, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 185, 186–87 (2013) (explaining how “pricing pressures resulting from unilateral
incentives following a vertical merger can be scored with vertical gross upward pricing pressures indices
(vGUPPIs)””); Michael H. Riordan, Competitive Effects of Vertical Integration, in HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST
ECONOMICS 145, 155–59 (Paolo Buccirossi ed., 2008).
68. See Steven C. Salop & Daniel P. Culley, Revising the U.S. Vertical Merger Guidelines: Policy Issues
and an Interim Guide for Practitioners, 4 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 1, 21 (2016).
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what will be profit-maximizing for the firm subsequent to the merger.69
If a vertical merger is anticompetitive under an input foreclosure or
discrimination theory, the incipiency rationale applies. That rationale is the same
as for unilateral effects from horizontal mergers; namely, antitrust rules do not
typically reach a single firm’s decisions about the price of its products or its
willingness to share them with rivals. A coherent approach to vertical merger
policy is therefore to condemn vertical mergers that are reasonably likely to
facilitate an anticompetitive refusal to deal, price discrimination, or price
increases that would be lawful if undertaken subsequently by a single firm.
Further, while these strategies would be unprofitable prior to the acquisition,
they become profitable after.70
For example, suppose that one firm owned program distribution facilities
such as DirecTV or cable systems while another firm owned nothing but
programming. Prior to any acquisition the latter firm would maximize revenue
by distributing as broadly as possible. Programming is nonrivalrous, meaning
that an infinite number of copies can be distributed. From the program owners’
point of view, the more the better. Once the programmer was acquired by the
owner of distribution facilities, however, the incentives of the new firm would
change. It might seek to black out, or exclude, some of the programming to
customers of rival distributors, perhaps in order to induce them to switch
distributors, or perhaps because its profit-maximizing price to customers of rival
systems would be higher than it had been prior to the merger. Higher prices to
customers of rivals will raise those rivals’ costs.
These predictions are a consequence of ordinary economic modeling that
assumes as a first principle that firms are profit-maximizers in whatever position
they find themselves.71 An important corollary is that the vertically integrated
firm would maximize profits across all of its divisions. That is, the fact that it is
organized into multiple divisions does not change the fact that its goal is to
maximize overall firm value, or profits. One problem with the district court
opinion in AT&T is that the court doubted this basic proposition. Instead, it
credited testimony from the merging firms’ employees that the post-merger firm
would not seek to maximize profits generally, but rather to maximize each
division separately.72 Fundamental economics predicts the contrary: having
acquired Time Warner (TW) as a collection of program assets, AT&T would
employ them so as to maximize its bottom line. The important consideration is
69. See, e.g., AT&T, 310 F. Supp. 3d at 222 (noting that the government’s expert had presented such
evidence).
70. See Steven C. Salop, Invigorating Vertical Merger Enforcement, 127 YALE L.J. 1962, 1979–80 (2018);
William P. Rogerson, A Vertical Merger in the Video Programming and Distribution Industry: The Case of
Comcast-NBCU (2011), in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION: ECONOMICS, COMPETITION, AND POLICY 534 (John
E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds., 6th ed. 2014).
71. See Aviv Nevo, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks as Prepared for the Stanford Institute for Economic
Policy Research and Cornerstone Research Conference on Antitrust in Highly Innovative Industries: Mergers
that Increase Bargaining Leverage 3–6 (Jan. 22, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/517781/download.
72. AT&T, 310 F. Supp. 3d at 223 (finding “serious tension” between the economic proposition that firms
maximize overall profits and defendant testimony that they do not).
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not what maximizes TW’s revenues individually as an independent profitmaximizing unit, but what maximizes the overall profits of the post-merger firm.
An employee might be perfectly sincere in testifying that she would not
maximize profits for the firm but would continue in familiar ways, looking
exclusively at the particular division that employed her. When confronted with
a disappointing bottom line, however, such employees would either change their
behavior or lose their jobs.
The merger challenger must also show that any refusal to deal or
discriminatory pricing practice would likely cause competitive harm if it
occurred. Many instances of vertical integration by merger result in refusals to
deal. For example, a manufacturer of lawn mowers that acquires its own dealer
in a community will very likely sell mowers through its newly acquired
dealership, refusing to sell mowers to local independent dealers. Although the
vertical merger might facilitate this refusal to deal, that does not establish that
the refusal is anticompetitive. As a general matter, we expect manufacturers who
own dealerships to sell through their own dealers.73
The fact that anticompetitive foreclosure or discrimination is not automatic
does not mean that it never occurs, however. As AT&T suggests, a broadband
internet provider that acquires substantial programming assets may be in a
position to deny that programming to distributors on rival internet providers, or
else charge them a higher price. The effect of the higher price could be either to
increase consumer prices or else to induce them to switch away from a
competitor’s broadband service to that of the post-merger firm.74 The
government alleged mainly that the merger between AT&T, an internet provider
whose assets include DirecTV and TW, which owned program content, would
enable the post-merger firm to force rival distributors of TW programming to
pay a higher price than TW’s current position would permit.75 The complaint
also alleged that the merger would slow the development of “disruptive,”
procompetitive innovations such as direct online video distribution. This
includes Sling TV and other “skinny” bundles that offer programming directly
over the internet rather than traditional cable.76
The 2011 merger between Comcast Corp. and NBC reflected analogous
concerns about denial of access to programming.77 The Comcast merger was
73. For several years, vertical mergers were brought under the now largely defunct theory that the postmerger firm would favor its own subsidiaries at the expense of rivals. See United States v. E.I. Du Pont De
Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 590–93 (1957) (accepting the government’s position that the vertical ownership
relationship between Du Pont and General Motors would incentivize General Motors to favor Du Pont when it
purchased seat cover fabrics and automobile paint, both of which were manufactured by both Du Pont and other
firms); Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345, 352–53 (2d Cir. 1979) (rejecting the theory that post-merger firms
will favor its own subsidiaries at the expense of rivals).
74. AT&T, 310 F. Supp. 3d at 194.
75. Complaint at ¶¶ 5–6, United States v. AT&T, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161 (D.D.C. 2018) (No. 17-2511).
76. Id. at 6–7 (“AT&T/DirecTV perceives online video distribution as an attack on its business that could,
in its own words, ‘deteriorate[] the value of the bundle.’” (alteration in original)).
77. See United States v. Comcast Corp., 808 F. Supp. 2d 145, 148–49 (D.D.C. 2011) (ordering a consent
decree).
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resolved by a consent decree that permitted the merger but required the postmerger firm to share its programming and grant access to rival programming on
fair and reasonable terms. The decree set up an arbitration mechanism to resolve
disputes. Judge Richard Leon, the same judge who presided over AT&T,
expressed considerable doubt about whether the arbitration scheme would
work,78 and there is evidence that it did not work all that well.79 Nevertheless,
he approved the consent decree.
Although it was not discussed in the AT&T decision, the Federal
Communications Commission’s December 2017 decision rolling back net
neutrality should increase antitrust scrutiny of vertical mergers in this industry,
at least if they involve a broadband provider.80 The net neutrality rules that had
been in place might have prohibited at least some of the vertical exclusion and
discriminatory treatment that can result from a vertical telecommunications
acquisitions.81
The argument that post-merger AT&T-TW will favor its own customers
and discriminate against the customers of rivals may sound a little like rejected
arguments from the 1970s. The concerns stated in earlier cases were that vertical
mergers gave a firm’s own customers preferential treatment over the customers
of rivals.82 There is one very important difference, however, although it is
specific to communications mergers and perhaps a few others. The “favoritism”
arguments in those earlier cases involved durable goods for which there was a
naturally finite supply.83 For example, in Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC, the FTC
argued that in time of short supply the post-merger firm would favor its own
subsidiary at the expense of rivals.84 But in most cases we would expect a truck
manager to use its wheel and brake subsidiary exclusively, and harm to
competition would be exceptional.
78. Complaint, supra note 75, ¶¶ 6–7.
79. See Jonathan Berr, Regulators in AT&T-Time Warner Deal Try to Avoid Repeating Past Mistakes,
FORBES (Nov. 21, 2017, 3:30 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jonathanberr/2017/11/21/regulators-in-atttime-warner-deal-try-to-avoid-repeating-past-mistakes/#5a57a95614e0 (discussing what occurred with the
selling of Hulu).
80. See Press Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, FCC Acts to Restore Internet Freedom (Dec. 14, 2017),
https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-takes-action-restore-internet-freedom.
81. See Tim Wu, Opinion, Why Blocking the AT&T-Time Warner Merger Might Be Right, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov.
9,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/09/opinion/att-time-warner-mergerfcc.html?mtrref=www.google.com&assetType=opinion (arguing that erosion of net neutrality will increase
anticompetitive potential of the merger); see also Jon Brodkin, Comcast Accused of Violating NBC Merger
Commitment and Net Neutrality Rule, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 3, 2016, 9:03 AM),
https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2016/03/comcast-accused-of-violating-nbc-mergercommitment-and-net-neutrality-rule/.
82. E.g., Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345, 352–53 (2d Cir. 1979); see also United States v. E.I. Du
Pont De Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 590–93 (1957).
83. E.g., E.I. Du Pont, 353 U.S. at 588–89 (involving automobile fabrics and finishes); Fruehauf, 603 F.2d
at 348 (involving heavy-duty truck wheels and antiskid brakes).
84. Id. at 354 (the FTC argued that “the merger violated § 7 with respect to the truck trailer market solely
on the theory that in the event of a shortage . . . Kelsey would give Fruehauf a substantial competitive advantage
over other trailer manufacturers by diverting to Fruehauf wheels that would otherwise go to Kelsey’s other
customers, some of which are trailer manufacturers”).
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By contrast, licensed films and television programming are nonrivalrous.
Once a TW asset such as Wonder Woman or the Harry Potter films has been
created, the digital files can be licensed an indefinite number of times. If postmerger AT&T-TW decides not to license Wonder Woman to a competing cable
company or to charge it a higher price, it is manifestly not because Wonder
Woman is in short supply and must be allocated among potential customers.
To think of this a little differently, an unintegrated programmer that owned
Wonder Woman and nothing else would maximize revenue by licensing to all
comers.85 Each sale increases profits and there are no shortages to be allocated,
for Wonder Woman can be licensed out an infinite number of times. As soon as
DirecTV, an AT&T asset, comes to own Wonder Woman, however, the postmerger firm has different incentives. Now it can withhold or threaten to withhold
Wonder Woman from the customers of competing internet providers as an
inducement to get customers to switch to DirecTV as their carrier, or charge
them higher prices. The result can be the creation or perpetuation of “silos” in
which each internet provider gives preferred or exclusive access to its own
internet customers. This results in reduced quality or variety of programming,
which is a qualifying output reduction under antitrust’s consumer welfare
principle.
The Comcast consent decree referred to above86 reflects a mechanism of
resolving antitrust disputes in communications markets with a combination of
antitrust and ongoing control. It has also been used in monopolization cases,
such as the consent decree that broke up the AT&T telephone monopoly in the
early 1980s.87 That decree resolved an antitrust case by a combination of a
structural remedy that broke the phone company into seven “Baby Bells,” and
ongoing oversight of interconnection disputes by a federal district judge.88 This
lasted until passage of the 1996 Telecommunications Act.89
As this history of antitrust regulation by consent decree suggests, antitrust
and regulation represent alternative approaches to competition issues that should
not be confused.90 Notwithstanding Judge Harold Greene’s heroic work
85. Although, it might be prevented from doing so by most-favored nation and similar agreements that are
common in the industry. See Erik Hovenkamp & Neel U. Sukhatme, Vertical Mergers and the MFN Thicket in
Television, ANTITRUST CHRON., Summer 2018, at 1.
86. United States v. Comcast Corp., 808 F. Supp. 2d 145, 149–50 (D.D.C. 2011) (ordering consent decree).
87. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 232 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d mem. sub nom., Maryland v. United
States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). A similar consent decree terminated the Government’s big section 2 case against
Microsoft. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d 144 (D.D.C. 2002); see also New York v. Microsoft
Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d 203 (D.D.C. 2002) (approving settlement).
88. The late Honorable Harold Greene provided oversight of the consent decree. Joseph D. Kearney, From
the Fall of the Bell System to the Telecommunications Act: Regulation of Telecommunications Under Judge
Greene, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1395, 1400–03 (1999).
89. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered sections of
47 U.S.C.).
90. See Daniel A. Crane, Bargaining in the Shadow of Rate-Setting Courts, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 307 (2009)
(recalling, among other things, the history of rate setting under the ASCAP and BMI consent decrees that
established what became the copyright royalty tribunal; also observing that even when a consent decree
contemplates managed rates the parties are able to negotiate them in a significant majority of cases); see also
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administering the AT&T breakup, antitrust is not a good vehicle for imposing
ongoing regulatory restrictions on a firm’s behavior. The “breakup” provision
of the 1982 AT&T consent decree was very much an antitrust remedy, but the
portion of the decree requiring ongoing supervision of interconnection disputes
was not, and in the 1996 Telecommunications Act it was more realistically
assigned over to the Federal Communications Commission and state
telecommunications regulators.
The one important difference between the AT&T telephone case and the
more recent vertical mergers is that AT&T was a single firm to begin with, and
the action against it had been brought under section 2 of the Sherman Act.91 This
made Clayton Act incipiency irrelevant. The telephone consent decree expresses
what antitrust can accomplish without a legislative assist in an action against a
single firm. Eventually, however, Congress acted. The interconnection
components of the consent decree were replaced by a regulatory provision that
transferred these obligations away from a federal court and to federal and state
agencies.92
Merger consent decrees with behavioral conditions are an attempt to avoid,
or at least soften, the implications of the incipiency test by expanding the scope
of antitrust so as to do things that antitrust could not accomplish on its own.
Consent decrees are contracts, and as such they can impose much more specific
and far reaching rules on the parties than would occur through ordinary antitrust
litigation.93 The one thing that they have difficulty providing, however, is
closure.94 Rather, they create ongoing obligations that need to be enforced until
the decree expires or is withdrawn.95
This does not mean that every unlawful merger must be completely
blocked. Select, targeted spinoffs are in fact structural forms of relief that
ordinarily do not require ongoing judicial supervision. If a particular asset is
likely to be a bottleneck, the appropriate solution may be to condemn the merger
unless the firms agree to divest that bottleneck asset to a third party who can be
expected to maintain it as a viable competitive presence. Or in the case of partial
asset acquisitions that leave both merging partners as separate ongoing concerns,

Daniel A. Crane, Intellectual Liability, 88 TEX. L. REV. 253, 266–67, 294 (2009).
91. The breakup occurred after one of the rare instances in which a court found a unilateral duty to deal, in
this case under the “essential facility” doctrine, which the Supreme Court has never approved. See MCI
Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1133, 1144 (7th Cir. 1983).
92. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered sections of
47 U.S.C.).
93. See, e.g., Flying J Inc. v. Comdata Network, Inc., 405 F.3d 821, 835–36 (10th Cir. 2005) (concluding
contract principles rather than substantive antitrust law controlled in interpretation of antitrust consent decree);
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 945–47 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (finding the same).
94. The problem is not a new one. See generally Note, Flexibility and Finality in Antitrust Consent
Decrees, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1303 (1967) (noting problem of ongoing supervision in merger consent decrees).
95. For a discussion on antitrust consent decrees, see 2A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 12, ¶ 327.
For a discussion on the history of antitrust consent decrees, see generally Eric J. Branfman, Antitrust Consent
Decrees—A Review and Evaluation of the First Seven Years Under the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act,
27 ANTITRUST BULL. 303 (1982).
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the government might simply object to some asset transfers, leaving them with
the original owner.96 But in either case the goal is to leave a market structure
that will sustain competition without the need for government oversight.
Another solution that is workable for some situations is insistence that IP
rights be nonexclusive in perpetuity rather than exclusive. Superficially, forcing
IP rights to be nonexclusive might sound “behavioral,” but in fact it is a purely
structural form of divestiture which permits multiple entities to make use of an
asset. Nonexclusive rights give a firm everything it needs to operate its own
business, enabling it to take advantage of expansion opportunities and up-to-date
technology. The one thing that they do not grant is the right to prevent
competitors from using that technology.97 For example, the consent decree that
broke up the telephone company provided for the compulsory licensing of
AT&T patents on a nonexclusive, nondiscriminatory basis.98 Antitrust consent
decrees that require nondiscriminatory licensing of patents are not uncommon.99
In applying section 7’s incipiency test to a vertical merger the challenger
needs to show four things, or in a few cases five. First, that the acquisition makes
particular behavior possible; second, that the post-acquisition market and the
position of the firm creates a reasonable likelihood that this behavior will occur,
which we can assume if it is profitable; third, that the behavior will be
anticompetitive if it does occur, with the presumptive measure being lower
output, higher prices, or reduced innovation; and fourth, that once the merger
has occurred and the conduct has become that of a single firm, it will be much
more difficult for antitrust law to detect and discipline. A possible fifth query,
as noted above in the discussion of net neutrality, would be whether non-antitrust
regulatory provisions are present and will police the feared conduct in a
satisfactory manner.100
96. For example, the recently proposed union of 21st Century Fox and Walt Disney Company is a partial
asset acquisition, in which Fox will sell some but not all of its assets to Disney. If a particular transfer is found
to be anticompetitive, the result may be to force Fox to retain that particular asset, leaving the rest of the merger
to proceed. Fox may, of course, later sell that asset to some other firm. For a discussion of the merger, see Steven
Zeitchik, Disney Buys Much of Fox in Megamerger that Will Shake World of Entertainment and Media, WASH.
POST (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2017/12/14/disney-buys-much-offox-in-mega-merger-that-will-shake-world-of-entertainment-and-media/?utm_term=.5b25155cc07c. The 2010
Horizontal Merger Guidelines have a section on partial acquisitions, but it is devoted largely to partial stock
acquisitions, which raise very different issues. See 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 31, § 13,
at 33–34.
97. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 4.1.2, at 21 (2017) [hereinafter ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY] (“A non-exclusive license of intellectual property that does not contain any restraints
on the competitive conduct of the licensor or the licensee generally does not present antitrust concerns.”).
98. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 135 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d mem. sub nom., Maryland v. United
States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983); see id. at 176 (explaining why it was now appropriate to eliminate compulsory
nonexclusive licensing requirements in a previous antitrust consent decree entered in 1956).
99. See, e.g., United States v. Nat’l Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 328 (1947) (approving elaborate consent
decree requiring licensing of patent on nondiscriminatory terms); see also United States v. Miller Indus., Inc.,
No. CIV. A. 00-CV-00 030, 2000 WL 33141220, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2000); United States v. Cookson Grp.
PLC, Civ. A. No. 92 2206, 1993 WL 735029, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 5, 1993).
100. For a discussion of this query in the context of a Sherman Act section 2 case, see Verizon Commc’ns,
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As the first two elements indicate, the fact finder must show not only that
a merger makes certain conduct possible, but also that the post-merger firm
would be likely to engage in it. In merger analysis this is ordinarily an objective
exercise, querying whether a practice such as refusal to deal or price
discrimination would be profitable for the firm in question. This is the way we
analyze the analogous problem for horizontal mergers—that is, by querying
whether a change in market position has increased the post-merger firm’s profitmaximizing price when measured against pre-merger levels.101
To give a simple example, subsequent to the merger between AT&T and
TW, the post-merger firm owns both DirecTV, which is an AT&T asset, and
Wonder Woman, which is a TW asset. At that point it would be in a position to
license Wonder Woman exclusively to DirecTV subscribers, thus excluding
subscribers who obtain their programming from Comcast, Verizon, Dish
Network, Mediacom, or several other suppliers of cable or wireless internet
services. It might also deny access to video streamers such as Netflix or Amazon.
Subsequent to the merger, this refusal to license would be an ordinary unilateral
refusal to deal, and antitrust law would presumably not require the post-merger
firm to share Wonder Woman with anyone else.102
While the merger makes this refusal to license possible, however, it does
not necessarily make it profitable. Wonder Woman promises to be a very high
margin product, producing high license fees even though the marginal cost of
distributing an already produced film is very low. Further Wonder Woman is
presumably not worth more to existing DirecTV subscribers simply because
subscribers to rival services are not able to get it. If the strategy of refusing to
supply Wonder Woman is to be profitable, the profits must come from
somewhere else. For example, Wonder Woman might be used as a lever to
induce customers of other services to switch to DirecTV. It is also possible that
post-merger AT&T-TW might either refuse to license or else raise internet
access costs of video streamers, including firms such as Netflix. Whether that is
profitable behavior is an empirical question.
There are also other dangers. For example, a world of concentrated cable
and internet companies who are also vertically integrated into programming
might lead to an oligopoly of “silos” in which each firm shares less content than
it would if content were independently owned. In more traditional markets for
physical goods such silos are a natural result of vertical integration. For example,
the major automobile manufacturers sell through their own dealerships. In the
case of video programming, however, the result could be that people would
receive less programming from a particular service. Unless these firms agree
with each other not to share programming, the practice would not be reachable
under section 1 of the Sherman Act unless the parties entered into a provable
Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). There, the Court declined antitrust liability
because a regulator was present and its regime “was an effective steward of the antitrust function.” Id. at 413.
101. See supra articles cited in note 53.
102. See 3B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 12, ¶¶ 770–74.
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contract or conspiracy, but merger policy could prevent the situation from
occurring in the first place. Absent that, the result could be that each internet
service provider offers a smaller range of programming than it otherwise would,
injuring customers by loss of variety.
V. ANTICOMPETITIVE ACQUISITIONS OF PATENTS OR OTHER IP RIGHTS
A patent or other intellectual property right103 creates a power to exclude,
whether or not the exclusion creates a product market monopoly.104 The
exclusion right is of course inherent in patent law and is the mechanism by which
patenting encourages invention. If a patent, or even a portfolio of patents, should
create a product monopoly antitrust nevertheless must keep its hand off, except
in the situation where the patent owner attempts to enforce a patent that it knows
or should know is invalid or unenforceable.105
However, patent law does not recognize a right to create a market
monopoly through means other than those contemplated in the patenting process
itself. The problem can arise when a firm assembles a market monopoly by
acquiring patents from outside inventors, or perhaps by acquiring firms holding
large patent portfolios.106 If a process can be accomplished by two competing
(that is, substitute) patent portfolios, the Patent Act authorizes whatever amount
of market power is created when one of those portfolios is created by invention.
It does not authorize the amount of additional monopoly that is created, however,
when the two portfolios of existing but competitively owned patents come under
common ownership.
Maintaining that line is particularly important because in most cases the
threat of market monopoly by means of merger is far greater than the threat of
market monopoly through internal invention and patenting. While a very strong,
market shifting patent can create a monopoly, most do not.107 A merger, by
contrast, is a simple act of transaction, not of invention. If three groups of assets,
patents or otherwise, collectively dominate a market a simple set of purchases

103. On the anticompetitive use of copyrights (in motion pictures), see Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc. v.
Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 55–61 (1993).
104. On the relationship between patents or other intellectual property rights and market power, see 2B
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 12, ¶ 518. In Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28,
31 (2006), the Supreme Court held that market power in an antitrust tying challenge could not be inferred from
the existence of a patent or copyright, but must be proven.
105. E.g., Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965) (patent
infringement suit brought by patentee who knew the patent was unenforceable could violate § 2 of the Sherman
Act); cf. Oskar Liivak, Overclaiming Is Criminal, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1417 (2017) (arguing for similar liability for
excessively broad claims).
106. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 92–97. Compare such a case to United States v. Winslow,
227 U.S. 202 (1913), in which Justice Holmes wrote the Court’s opinion approving the merger of firms owning
three complementary technologies for producing shoes (lasting machines, welt-sewing machines, and outsolestitching machines), including their patents. The result was the creation of the United Shoe Machinery monopoly,
which lasted roughly a half century. See CARL KAYSEN, UNITED STATES V. UNITED SHOE MACHINERY
CORPORATION: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF AN ANTI-TRUST CASE 100 (1956).
107. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 29, § 3.9d, at 185–87.
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can turn them instantly into a market monopoly.
A firm can thus threaten competition by buying up all of the patents
necessary for production in a particular line of commerce.108 For example,
suppose that two inventors have developed the only two alternative processes
for producing a particular type of microprocessor chip. Both are covered by
portfolios of patents, each developed by the two inventors independently. These
two owners could then either use the portfolios themselves or license them to
others. Assuming that the manufacturers are not colluding and that the two
alternatives are equally effective, the market could perform as competitively as
we might expect from a two-firm market. It might be even more competitive if
the two firms licensed their portfolios to third parties.
Suppose, however, that the owner of one of these competing patent
portfolios should acquire the portfolio held by the other. This owner then
continues to use its existing portfolio of patents but keeps the acquired portfolio
unused. Alternatively, a non-practicing entity might acquire both portfolios and
then license one or both of them. In both of these cases the acquisition would
have created a market monopoly over the processes for making this chip, and in
a way that is not authorized by the Patent Act.109 One patentee may also purchase
or license patents from another.110 However, there is no right in the Patent Act
to make an acquisition that creates a monopoly.111 While competitively harmless
patent acquisitions are authorized by the Patent Act, patents are also “assets”
that are subject to the merger laws.112 In addition, if one firm acquires another
firm with a substantial patent portfolio, that merger is subject to condemnation
under the merger laws.113
In Intellectual Ventures I, LLC v. Capital One Financial Corp., the district
108. See Erik Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, Buying Monopoly: Antitrust Limits on Damages for
Externally Acquired Patents, 25 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 39, 54 (2017); cf. Trebro Mfg., Inc. v. Firefly Equip.,
LLC, 748 F.3d 1159 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (permitting firm to acquire a patent from an outside inventor, keep it
unusued, but then obtain an injunction against a competitor).
109. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012) (defining scope of patent infringement).
110. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (granting right to assign and license).
111. That is, the right to acquire a patent does not entail a right to do so anticompetitively. See Herbert
Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Patent System: A Reexamination, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 467, 515–23 (2015).
112. W. Geophysical Co. of Am., Inc. v. Bolt Assocs., Inc., 440 F.2d, 765, 772 (2d Cir. 1971) (exclusive
patent license with an obligation to develop sublicenses after two years could be covered by section 7 of the
Clayton Act); Automated Bldg. Components, Inc. v. Trueline Truss Co., 318 F. Supp. 1252, 1261 (D. Or. 1970)
(acquisition of various assets including patent applications covered by section 7); Dairy Foods, Inc. v. Farmers
Coop. Creamery, 298 F. Supp. 774, 777 (D. Minn. 1969) (patent acquisition subject to section 7); see also Pharm.
Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. FTC, 790 F.3d 198, 200 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (applying Chevron deference and
approving FTC rule); Premerger Notification; Reporting and Waiting Period Requirements, 78 Fed. Reg. 68,705,
68,705–07 (Nov. 15, 2013) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R pt. 801) (revising FTC’s requirement of reporting of
significant acquisitions of exclusive rights in pharmaceutical patents). For a discussion on patents as “assets”
covered by section 7 of the Clayton Act, see ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY, supra note 97, § 5.7, at 34; 1 HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 14.01 (3d ed. 2017).
113. FTC v. CCC Holdings, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d 26, 76–77 (D.D.C. 2009) (enjoining acquisition combining
two firms whose principal assets were patented, specialized software); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO
PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 2–3 (2003).
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court dismissed a section 7 lawsuit that raised some of these issues.114
Intellectual Ventures (IV), a non-practicing entity, had acquired from third-party
inventors substantially all of the patents covering certain types of transactions in
financial services industries. At the time the value or validity of the patents was
largely undetermined, although some were later found invalid.115 The antitrust
challenger alleged that IV’s strategy was to obtain patent ownership blanketing
the entire market, making it impossible for banks to do business in this market
without licensing IV’s patents.116 For purposes of this strategy the acquired
patents would have to be treated as substitutes, or competitors, so this was a
horizontal merger.117
In rejecting an antitrust merger challenge by the infringement defendant,
the court reasoned that once the merger occurred and IV owned all the patents
in question, then it would have a legal right to enforce them. This right would
be limited only by the restraints that antitrust or patent law impose on the
bringing of infringement actions on unenforceable patents.118 Since the only way
competition could be lessened by the merger was through the bringing of
infringement suits, the court reasoned, the merger was lawful because that right
was protected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which creates a right to bring
a lawsuit reasonably believed to be meritorious.119 While Walker Process
liability can condemn a lawsuit on a patent known to be unenforceable, both the
Patent Act120 and the First Amendment petitioning right recognized in the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine permits suits on patents reasonably believed by the
enforcer to be valid and infringed.121
Factually, of course, that is true. Once someone owns a portfolio of patents
it has a right to enforce any or all of them. But, under the incipiency test, this
counts against rather than in favor of the merger. The Patent Act permits both
the invention of monopoly-creating technologies and the transfer of patents;
however, it does not permit the creation of monopoly by means of transfer rather
than invention. Here the merger incipiency test is essential because, once the
anticompetitive acquisition has occurred, the infringement lawsuits will be
114. 280 F. Supp. 3d 691, 694 (D. Md. 2017), appeal filed, No. 18-1367 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 2, 2018).
115. See Intellectual Ventures I, LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (finding
patents in question invalid as directed toward abstract ideas).
116. Intellectual Ventures I, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 697 (“Capital One characterizes IV’s business model as
comprised of three components: accumulate a vast portfolio of patents purportedly relating to essential
commercial banking services, conceal the details of those patents so that the banks cannot determine whether
their products infringe any of IV’s patents, and serially litigate to force the banks to capitulate and license the
portfolio at exorbitant cost.”).
117. Portfolios of patents would naturally include both substitutes and complements, but a strategy of
eliminating alternatives would naturally apply to their competitive relationship.
118. Intellectual Ventures I, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 705.
119. Id.
120. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3) (2012).
121. See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 663 (1965); E. R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr
Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 136–37 (1961). For a discussion on the use of the doctrine in antitrust
litigation, see 2 PHILLIP C. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶¶ 201–08 (4th ed. 2014).
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treated as the conduct of a single firm. In that case, an antitrust court is powerless
to intervene except in the very narrow circumstances defined by the Walker
Process doctrine.
Indeed, if given precedential effect, the district court’s holding would
effectively prohibit application of section 7 of the Clayton Act to virtually any
acquisition of rights in intellectual property. The mechanism by which such an
acquisition “lessens” competition will always be the power to assert the acquired
right against infringers, a right that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine protects.122
It is worth noting that the right to enforce traditional property rights in court
is also protected by the First Amendment petitioning immunity. For example, it
protects the land owner’s right to file a complaint against trespassers.123 But that
hardly means that all acquisitions of plant and equipment are immune from
section 7 simply because these property rights, once acquired, can be legally
enforced.
The problem of anticompetitive patent or other IP acquisitions can often be
best addressed by insisting that IP acquisitions that would otherwise violate
section 7 be limited to nonexclusive licenses. The acquisition of a non-exclusive
license gives a firm, whether monopolist or not, all it needs to produce in the
market in question, thus enabling it to use acquired patents to stay up to date
with technology. What it does not do, however, is give the dominant firm a right
to shut down or otherwise challenge the technology of others, as in the
Intellectual Ventures litigation. The acquisition problem is doubly serious when
the patents in question are not merely acquired from an outside inventor, but
when they are acquired and unused.124 The principal value of a patent license is
to enable a firm to produce using the licensed technology. A nonexclusive
license is all it needs for this purpose. Recognizing this, several merger decrees,
both litigated and by consent, have conditioned acquisitions on the parties’
agreement to turn patent assignments or exclusive licenses into nonexclusive
licenses.125
To be sure, such an approach very largely undermines the Intellectual
Ventures business model whenever the acquisitions in question are
122. See Brief for the U.S. & FTC as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 20–21, Intellectual
Ventures I, LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., No. 18-1367 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 2, 2018) (quoting this Article and
concluding that “[l]ikewise, Noerr-Pennington does not protect anticompetitive patent acquisitions from
antitrust liability simply because the patent holder subsequently engages in protected litigation activity”).
123. See, e.g., Venetian Casino Resort, L.L.C. v. NLRB, 793 F.3d 85 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (concluding that a
casino owner’s summoning of police officers to enforce state law of trespass to land was protected by
Noerr-Penningon, provided that the walkway in question was really a part of casino owner’s private property).
124. For a discussion of this problem, see generally Erik Hovenkamp & Thomas F. Cotter, Anticompetitive
Patent Injunctions, 100 MINN. L. REV. 871 (2016). For a discussion on the history of dominant firm strategies
of filing infringement suits on externally acquired by unused patents, see Herbert Hovenkamp, The Emergence
of Classical American Patent Law, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 263, 285–89 (2016).
125. E.g., Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 103 F.T.C. 467, 461 (1984) (applying section 7 to a patent acquisition
and requiring a nonexclusive license as the remedy in consent decree); see also Ciba-Geigy Ltd., 123 F.T.C 842
(1997) (requiring merged firms to license several gene therapy patents to a different firm); Boston Sci. Corp.,
119 F.T.C. 549 (1995) (conditioning merger approval on royalty free license in order to avoid abuse of dominant
position).
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anticompetitive. But that hardly means that the original patent owners in
question are left without a remedy. To return to the hypothetical situation of two
competing patent portfolios for making a microprocessor,126 a producer would
still have to acquire licenses to one of these two portfolios, and it would have
the right that is consistent with both patent law and antitrust law, which is to
acquire that right in a competitive market in which the rival patentees could bid
for that manufacturer’s licensing business.
To summarize, a patent gives its owner the right to profit from the patented
technology by either practicing it or licensing it out in whatever market the
patentee finds itself. It does not, however, create a right to create market
monopoly by transfer as opposed to invention. The merger incipiency rule gives
effect to this limitation.
VI. ACQUISITIONS OF SMALL BUT HIGHLY INNOVATIVE FIRMS
A large firm’s acquisition of a small, highly innovative firm can raise
serious long run competition issues, even if the two firms are not competitors at
the time of the acquisition. Such an acquisition may not have an immediate
impact on price. Further, many of them have an efficiency justification—
namely, that adding a complementary technology to the acquiring firm’s product
is good for consumers. For example, Facebook’s 2014 acquisition of WhatsApp
enabled it to expand its profile in the chat market, augmenting the value of its
primary product.127 Google’s 2016 acquisition of Orbitera enabled it to compete
more effectively with Amazon in the management of cloud-based software.128
Since their founding, the large internet tech firms including Facebook, Alphabet
(Google), Microsoft, and Apple have made more than 500 such acquisitions.129
126. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 93–94.
127. See Josh Constine, A Year Later, $19 Billion for WhatsApp Doesn’t Sound So Crazy, TECHCRUNCH,
https://techcrunch.com/2015/02/19/crazy-like-a-facebook-fox/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2018).
128. See Justine Brown, Google Acquires Orbitera to Help Encourage Multi-Cloud Environments,
CIODIVE (Aug. 9, 2016), https://www.ciodive.com/news/google-acquires-orbitera-to-help-encourage-multicloud-environments/424071/.
129. Wikipedia maintains lists of smaller firms acquired by large technology companies. E.g., List of
Mergers
and
Acquisitions
by
Facebook,
WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_mergers_and_acquisitions_by_Facebook (last visited Nov. 21, 2018)
(listing sixty-eight acquisitions); List of Mergers and Acquisitions by Alphabet, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_mergers_and_acquisitions_by_Alphabet#List_of_mergers_and_acquisiti
ons (last visited Nov. 21, 2018) (listing more than 200); List of Mergers and Acquisitions by Microsoft,
WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_mergers_and_acquisitions_by_Microsoft (last visited Nov.
21, 2018) (listing more than 200); List of Mergers and Acquisitions by Apple, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_mergers_and_acquisitions_by_Apple#Acquisitions (last visited Nov. 21,
2018) (listing ninety-nine acquisitions). In addition, eBay has acquired some sixty companies. See List of
Acquisitions by eBay, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_acquisitions_by_eBay (last visited Nov.
21, 2018). Yahoo! has acquired 114. See List of Mergers and Acquisitions by Yahoo!, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_mergers_and_acquisitions_by_Yahoo! (last visited Nov. 21, 2018).
Twitter has acquired fifty-five. See List of Mergers and Acquisitions by Twitter, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_mergers_and_acquisitions_by_Twitter (last visited Nov. 21, 2018). IBM
has acquired more than 150. See List of Mergers and Acquisitions by IBM, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_mergers_and_acquisitions_by_IBM#Acquisitions_since_2000
(last
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While many of these acquisitions are economically beneficial, a few pose
serious competitive risks,130 but assessing them is difficult. Small, highly
innovative firms can grow into larger ones, offering more competition in the
market in question, but their acquisition by large incumbents eliminates that
possibility.131 The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines contain a brief discussion
of the issue, recognizing two dangers. First, an acquired firm might be involved
in introducing “new products that would capture substantial revenues from the
other merging firm.”132 Second is a long-run effect that might occur “if at least
one of the merging firms has capabilities that are likely to lead it to develop new
products in the future that would capture substantial revenues from the other
merging firm.”133
This is one area where merger law’s substantiality test needs to do some
real work. Courts should rely on the principle that the offense should be
differentiated according to the remedy that is sought.134 When the only remedy
is an injunction against the transaction, enforcement agencies and courts should
be more willing to stop the acquisition. In particular, when the acquiring firm
cannot point to a particular, provable efficiency or product improvement the
government’s burden should be light.
Determining optimal structural remedies can be difficult. Limiting
acquisitions to nonexclusive licenses may be a workable antitrust solution in
some cases, but not all. Such a license would permit the acquiring firm to take
advantage of the acquired firm’s technology, thus improving its own product or
range of products, but without giving it a right to exclude others. For example,
all Facebook needed to improve its chatting function was a nonexclusive license
to the WhatsApp technology.135
Offsetting this is the fact that a nonexclusive right can be worth less than
an exclusive one. Small firms may be less valuable if they cannot transfer

visited Nov. 21, 2018).
130. See Terrell McSweeny, FTC Comm’r, Remarks at the 18th International Conference on Competition
in Berlin, Germany: Understanding Innovation and Its Role in U.S. Merger Review (Mar. 16, 2017),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1176893/berlin_international_conference_on_c
ompetition_final.pdf.
131. See, e.g., United States v. Bazaarvoice, Inc., No. 13-cv-00133-WHO, 2014 WL 203966, at *2, 36–38
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2014) (enjoining acquisition of innovative competitor, although there were also concerns about
elimination of price competition in a highly concentrated market); Complaint at ¶ 40, Verisk Analytics, Inc., No.
9363 (FTC Dec. 16, 2014) (challenging merger of highly innovative new entrant that could have offered greater
competition to established firm).
132. 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 31, § 6.4, at 23; see also Commission Guidelines
on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers Under the Council Regulation on the Control of Concentrations
Between Undertakings, 2004 O.J. (C 31) ¶¶ 8, 20, 38, 45.
133. 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 31, § 6.4, at 23; see also Gordon M. Phillips &
Alexei Zhdanov, R&D and the Incentives from Merger and Acquisition Activity 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research Working Paper No. 18346, 2012) (concluding that data suggests that the prospect of acquisition
induces smaller firms to innovate more in hope of selling out, but larger firms to innovate less because they
would prefer to obtain new technology by merger rather than internal development).
134. See 2 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 121, ¶ 303c.
135. See Constine, supra note 127.
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exclusive rights in their innovative technologies to a dominant firm. Acquisition
of a nonexclusive license is also a partial asset acquisition, leaving the selling
firm with the untransferred assets. As a result, one might think that such
acquisitions may not provide the selling firms with an attractive means of exiting
from the market. But that argument is a red herring. The fact that some part of
the selling firm’s assets remain with that firm does not obligate it to continue in
business. Another alternative, which can avoid some of these problems, is to
permit the acquisition but require the acquiring firm to license competitively
problematic acquired assets to third parties.
Acquisitions of innovative startups are valuable to society because they
enable the acquiring firm to improve its product or keep up with technological
change. Accordingly, when a large firm acquires a highly innovative small firm
and then either shuts that firm down or fails to deploy its technology, this
opportunity for gain is lost. In that case the principal consequence of the
acquisition is to prevent the acquired firm’s technology from reaching the
market at all. As a result, antitrust law should give close scrutiny to acquisitions
of small firms whose assets are unlikely to be deployed into the market.
Nondeployment of the acquired technology entails that there is no efficiency
explanation for the acquisition, and this should justify a harsh rule.
Also deserving scrutiny are acquisitions of small firms whose product
serves to duplicate the acquiring firm’s product rather than providing a valuable
complementary extension. The most prominent explanation of such an
acquisition is elimination of the acquired firm’s anticipated competition.
Another solution that is promising in some situations is post-acquisition
challenges. Some mergers might not be predictably anticompetitive at the time
of the transaction but become so later on. Further, a government action for an
injunction is not governed by the Clayton Act’s four year statute of limitation,
but rather by the equitable, judge-made doctrine of laches, which in appropriate
circumstances can permit such a lawsuit long after the merger has occurred.136
The traditional rule is that the doctrine of laches as a limitation on equitable
relief, as opposed to damages, does not run against the government, although it
may bear on the type of relief to which the government is entitled. The courts
generally look at the overall situation, shortening the period where it seems clear
that the challenger could have acted earlier but did not do so, or lengthening it
when the anticompetitive threat did not emerge until years after the acquisition
occurred.137 For example, if a merger presents a competitive threat only several
136. See California v. Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 295–96 (1990) (holding that the government could
bring equity challenge to merger even though time period for plaintiff had expired). Justice Kennedy concurred,
but objected to the majority conclusion that laches might run more slowly against the government. Id. at 298
(Kennedy, J., concurring). For a discussion on the judge-made doctrine of laches governing equity suits in
antitrust cases, see 2 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, ¶ 320g (4th ed. 2013).
137. United States v. Pullman Co., 50 F. Supp. 123, 127 (E.D. Pa. 1943) (noting that laches does not run
against the government, but doubting that full remedial relief would be appropriate where the acquisition had
occurred a half century earlier). See, e.g., Ginsburg v. InBev NV/SA, 623 F.3d 1229, 1235 (8th Cir. 2010)
(applying laches to completed merger where “the hardship and competitive disadvantage resulting from forced
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years after an acquisition, then the government should be excused for not
bringing its action earlier. In all events, it must be clear that the emergent
competitive threat was caused by the merger, and this will not necessarily be
easy when the challenge follows the merger by many years. On the other hand,
it should be relatively clear when the firm’s use of the acquired asset is the source
of the harm. Harm is also clear when the acquired technology is not being used
at all but the merger enables the acquiring firm to keep it away from rivals.
CONCLUSION
Government equity suits against mergers seem to require the courts to peer
into a crystal ball. Most mergers today are challenged before they occur, but
even afterwards certain effects may take years to materialize. As a result, there
is a degree of long range prediction in merger litigation that goes far beyond
what is common in other areas of law.
The need to predict the future would not be particularly important if every
practice that a merger threatens could readily be detected and condemned should
it occur later. In that case we could rest easy, permitting the merger to attain
whatever efficiencies it is likely to produce, knowing that anticompetitive
consequences can be interdicted if and when they materialize.
But too many anticompetitive practices do not fall into that category. Often
post-merger conduct is likely to be anticompetitive but antitrust law has
inadequate tools for dealing with it directly. This is particularly true of two
classes of cases. One is coordinated, interdependent pricing that threatens
reduced output or higher prices, but that is not readily reachable under antitrust
law’s “agreement” requirement.138 The other is conduct that, once the merger
occurs, becomes unilateral and is able to take advantage of antitrust law’s
general toleration for unilateral price setting and refusals to deal.139
Finally, the extent to which a court in a merger case must predict a
probabilistic future varies with the situation. In traditional merger cases
concerned with collusion-like conduct, the feared impact could occur soon after
the merger transaction is completed. That is also true for most unilateral effects
horizontal merger cases. Foreclosure from vertical acquisitions may take
somewhat longer to materialize, and patent infringement suits based on
monopolistic combinations of externally acquired patents may have an even
longer timeline. The longest latency period is very likely the acquisition of small
but highly innovative firms, which absent the acquisition might take several
divestiture would be both dramatic and certain”); Midwestern Mach. Co. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 392 F.3d 265,
265 (8th Cir. 2004) (concluding laches barred eleven-year delay in challenge to acquisition, at least where the
transaction was known to plaintiff since it occurred); cf. Julius Nasso Concrete Corp. v. Dic Concrete Corp., 467
F. Supp. 1016, 1024 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (concluding laches serves to bar a claim only if the delay prejudices a
defense that was otherwise available); see also United States v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586,
622–24 (1957) (Burton, J., dissenting) (noting the traditional position that laches does not run against the
government). Laches does apply to private plaintiffs).
138. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 10–11.
139. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 40–44.
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years to grow into meaningful rivals, assuming they ever do.
Offsetting this is that the government equity action calls for no other
remedy than a preemptive injunction against the acquisition. There are no prison
sentences, large fines, private damages actions or other costly remedies other
than prevention of the transaction itself.140 Further, in the latter two sets of cases
involving patent rights and highly innovative firms, acquisition of non-exclusive
rights or selective compulsory licensing may provide the full set of economic
benefits that the acquiring firm requires.

140. For a discussion on the importance of defining the breadth of the offense inversely to the permissible
remedy, see 2 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 121, ¶ 303c.

